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Elevating Competition: Classical Political Economy in Justice Peckham's Jurisprudence

Year:    2017

Author:    Giocoli, Nicola

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 137 (2017), Iss. 4 : pp. 331–370

Abstract

This paper deals with the famous Lochner v. New York (1905) decision from the perspective of the history of economic thought. In »Lochner« the Supreme Court affirmed freedom of contract as a substantive constitutional right. It is argued that, in writing for the majority, Justice Rufus W. Peckham was heavily influenced by classical political economy. Not, however, in the trivial sense of endorsing pure laissez faire, but in the deeper sense of applying Adam Smith’s recipe for building a “system of natural liberty”, viz., a social order founded on justice, private property, and free competition. My interpretation is validated by looking at the economic content of Peckham’s jurisprudence as a judge in the New York Court of Appeals.

Journal Article Details

Publisher Name:    Global Science Press

Language:    English

DOI:    https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.137.4.331

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 137 (2017), Iss. 4 : pp. 331–370

Published online:    2017-10

AMS Subject Headings:    Duncker & Humblot

Copyright:    COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press

Pages:    40

Keywords:    B12 K21 L40

Author Details

Giocoli, Nicola

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