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Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty

Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty

Year:    2011

Author:    Göcke, Matthias

Applied Economics Quarterly, Vol. 57 (2011), Iss. 2 : pp. 91–105

Abstract

Efficiency wage effects of profit sharing are combined with option values related to stochastic future profit variations. These option effects occur if the workers' profit share is fixed by long-term contracts. The Pareto-improving optimal level of the sharing ratio is calculated for two different scenarios: (1) the firm can unilaterally decide, the expected present value of net profits is maximised; (2) the sharing ratio is based on bilateral Nash bargaining. Since a larger variation of revenues implies a higher redistribution of future profits, the inclusion of expected variations results in a lower worker's profit ratio in both scenarios.

JEL Classification: D81, J33

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Journal Article Details

Publisher Name:    Global Science Press

Language:    English

DOI:    https://doi.org/10.3790/aeq.57.2.91

Applied Economics Quarterly, Vol. 57 (2011), Iss. 2 : pp. 91–105

Published online:    2011-04

AMS Subject Headings:    Duncker & Humblot

Copyright:    COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press

Pages:    15

Author Details

Göcke, Matthias