Year: 2008
Author: Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl, Vagstad, Steinar
Applied Economics Quarterly, Vol. 54 (2008), Iss. 3 : pp. 203–215
Abstract
We review the recent literature on mobile termination rates (MTR) in mobile communication networks (M2M). This literature shows that mobile networks may have incentives to charge ineficient high termination charges leading to reduced surplus for consumers and society, and therefore should be regulated. We discuss optimal regulation of MTRs and the two main objectives behind current regulation: excessive pricing and entry assistance. We also present a sketch of a new regulatory regime for the mobile industry.
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Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: English
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/aeq.54.3.203
Applied Economics Quarterly, Vol. 54 (2008), Iss. 3 : pp. 203–215
Published online: 2008-08
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 13
Author Details
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