Year: 2021
Author: Mañalich R., Juan Pablo
Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics, Vol. 29 (2021), Iss. 1 : pp. 177–188
Abstract
The traditional understanding of the criminal law’s concept of dolus is grounded on its definition as the conjunction of a volitional and a cognitive attitude towards the satisfaction of the abstract description that specifies the corresponding offense. Although so-called “cognitivist” conceptions persuasively argue for the redundancy of the purported volitional component, the theoretical adequacy of the recourse to the concept of knowledge is very rarely called into question. The display of a teleological-analytical model for clarifying the general structure of a criminal offense can show that, according to its distinctively ascriptive function, the concept of dolus ought to be taken as requiring a predictive belief referred to an (unjustified) instance of the relevant actus reus, whereas such a predictive belief need not satisfy the semantic and epistemic conditions for an attribution of knowledge.
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Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: German
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/jre.29.1.177
Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics, Vol. 29 (2021), Iss. 1 : pp. 177–188
Published online: 2021-01
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 12
Author Details
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juan Pablo Mañalich R., Vorsatz als Wissen? Zu einigen semantischen und epistemischen Voraussetzungen der subjektiven Zurechnung Vorsatz als Wissen? | 177 | ||
| I. Die negative Zurechnungsfunktion des Intentionsbegriffs | 177 | ||
| II. Vorsatz als prädiktive Vorstellung | 179 | ||
| III. Exakte Normkenntnis als hypothetische Vorbedingung der Vorsatzzuschreibung | 180 | ||
| IV. Die Irrelevanz der epistemischen Rechtfertigung der prädiktiven Vorstellung | 184 | ||
| V. Die Irrelevanz der Wahrheit der prädiktiven Vorstellung | 177 | ||
| Summary | 177 |