THIS IS THE DEV/TESTING WEBSITE IPv4: 18.188.159.66 IPv6: || Country by IP: GB
Close Search Advanced
Journals
Resources
About Us
Open Access
Journals
Resources
About Us
Open Access

Inhaberkontrollierte Unternehmen: Robust durch die letzte Dekade

Inhaberkontrollierte Unternehmen: Robust durch die letzte Dekade
Preview
Add to basket

Year:    2022

Author:    Immenkötter, Philipp, Lehmann, Kai

ZfKE – Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship, Vol. 70 (2022), Iss. 1 : pp. 51–60

Abstract

Owner-controlled companies: Robust through the last decade

Profitability, low financial risk, and efficient capital allocation are the distinctive characteristics of owner-controlled companies. In the last decade, they have generated an annual excess return of 3.2 % compared to a peer group of listed companies. The reasons for this beneficial development are to be found in the strategic vision and motivation of the owners, which favour a long-term and economically sustainable strategy and outweigh the disadvantages of power concentration and family ties.

You do not have full access to this article.

Already a Subscriber? Sign in as an individual or via your institution

Journal Article Details

Publisher Name:    Global Science Press

Language:    German

DOI:    https://doi.org/10.3790/zfke.70.1.51

ZfKE – Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship, Vol. 70 (2022), Iss. 1 : pp. 51–60

Published online:    2022-01

AMS Subject Headings:    Duncker & Humblot

Copyright:    COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press

Pages:    10

Author Details

Immenkötter, Philipp

Lehmann, Kai

  1. Anderson, R., Mansi, S. und Reeb, D. (2003): Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt, in: Journal of Financial Economics, 68(2), 263–285.  Google Scholar
  2. Andres, C. (2008): Large shareholders and firm performance–An empirical examination of founding-family ownership, in: Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(4), 431–445.  Google Scholar
  3. Demsetz, H. (1983): The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm, in: The Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 375–390.  Google Scholar
  4. Demsetz, H. und Lehn, K. (1985): The Structure of corporate ownership: Causes and Consequences, in: Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155–1177.  Google Scholar
  5. Fama, E. und Jensen, M. (1983): Separation of ownership and control, in: The Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 301–325.  Google Scholar
  6. Hiller, D. und McColgan, P. (2008): An analysis of majority owner-managed companies in the UK, in: Accounting & Finance, 48(4), 603–623.  Google Scholar
  7. Hoopes, D. und Miller, D. (2006): Ownership Preferences, Competitive Heterogeneity, and Family-Controlled Businesses, in: Family Business Review, 19(2), 89–101.  Google Scholar
  8. Immenkötter, P. und Lehmann, K. (2019): Der Schlüssel zu Skin in the Game, Flossbach von Storch Research Institute, Köln, Deutschland, [https://www.flossbachvonstorch-researchinstitute.com/de/studien/der-schluessel-zu-skin-in-the-game/], abgerufen am 17.01.2022.  Google Scholar
  9. James, H. (1999): Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family Firm, in: International Journal of the Economics of Business, 6(1), 41–55.  Google Scholar
  10. Jensen, M. (1994): Selt Interest, Altruism, Incentives, and Agency Theory, in Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7(2), 40–45.  Google Scholar
  11. Jensen, M. und Meckling, W. (1976): Theory of the firm. Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure, in: Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.  Google Scholar
  12. Maury, B. (2006): Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations, in: Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(4), 321–341.  Google Scholar
  13. Sageder, M., Mitter, C. und Feldbauer-Durstmüller, B. (2018): Image and reputation of family firms: a systematic literature review of the state of research, in: Review of Managerial Science, 12, 335–377.  Google Scholar
  14. Schulze, W., Lubatkin, M., Dino, R. und Buchholtz, A. (2001): Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence, in Organizational Science, 12(2), 99–116.  Google Scholar
  15. Villalonga, B. und Amit, R. (2006): How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?, in: Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385–417.  Google Scholar
  16. Wagner, D., Block, J., Miller, D., Schwens, C. und Xi, G. (2015): A meta-analysis of the financial performance of family firms: Another attempt, in: Journal of Family Business Strategy, 6(1), 3–13.  Google Scholar
  17. Anderson, R., Mansi, S. und Reeb, D. (2003): Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt, in: Journal of Financial Economics, 68(2), 263–285.  Google Scholar
  18. Andres, C. (2008): Large shareholders and firm performance–An empirical examination of founding-family ownership, in: Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(4), 431–445.  Google Scholar
  19. Demsetz, H. (1983): The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm, in: The Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 375–390.  Google Scholar
  20. Demsetz, H. und Lehn, K. (1985): The Structure of corporate ownership: Causes and Consequences, in: Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155–1177.  Google Scholar
  21. Fama, E. und Jensen, M. (1983): Separation of ownership and control, in: The Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 301–325.  Google Scholar
  22. Hiller, D. und McColgan, P. (2008): An analysis of majority owner-managed companies in the UK, in: Accounting & Finance, 48(4), 603–623.  Google Scholar
  23. Hoopes, D. und Miller, D. (2006): Ownership Preferences, Competitive Heterogeneity, and Family-Controlled Businesses, in: Family Business Review, 19(2), 89–101.  Google Scholar
  24. Immenkötter, P. und Lehmann, K. (2019): Der Schlüssel zu Skin in the Game, Flossbach von Storch Research Institute, Köln, Deutschland, [https://www.flossbachvonstorch-researchinstitute.com/de/studien/der-schluessel-zu-skin-in-the-game/], abgerufen am 17.01.2022.  Google Scholar
  25. James, H. (1999): Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family Firm, in: International Journal of the Economics of Business, 6(1), 41–55.  Google Scholar
  26. Jensen, M. (1994): Selt Interest, Altruism, Incentives, and Agency Theory, in Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7(2), 40–45.  Google Scholar
  27. Jensen, M. und Meckling, W. (1976): Theory of the firm. Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure, in: Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.  Google Scholar
  28. Maury, B. (2006): Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations, in: Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(4), 321–341.  Google Scholar
  29. Sageder, M., Mitter, C. und Feldbauer-Durstmüller, B. (2018): Image and reputation of family firms: a systematic literature review of the state of research, in: Review of Managerial Science, 12, 335–377.  Google Scholar
  30. Schulze, W., Lubatkin, M., Dino, R. und Buchholtz, A. (2001): Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence, in Organizational Science, 12(2), 99–116.  Google Scholar
  31. Villalonga, B. und Amit, R. (2006): How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?, in: Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385–417.  Google Scholar
  32. Wagner, D., Block, J., Miller, D., Schwens, C. und Xi, G. (2015): A meta-analysis of the financial performance of family firms: Another attempt, in: Journal of Family Business Strategy, 6(1), 3–13.  Google Scholar

Section Title Page Action Price
Philipp Immenkötter / Kai Lehmann: Inhaberkontrollierte Unternehmen: Robust durch die letzte Dekade 1
Zusammenfassung 1
Abstract 1
I. Hintergrund und Erkenntnisgewinn 2
II. Datenbasis 3
III. Profitabilität: Margen und Kapitalrenditen 3
IV. Solvenz: Gearing, Zinsdeckung, Pensionslasten 5
V. Kapitalmarktperformance 7
VI. Fazit 8
Literatur 9