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Explaining Cross-Country Variations in Venture Capital Investments: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Year:    2004

Author:    Schertler, Andrea

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 37 (2004), Iss. 3 : pp. 297–328

Abstract

This paper investigates why venture capital investments substantially vary across countries. Using a general equilibrium model, I show that the development of venture capital finance depends on the dominance of the banking market because bank finance determines a lower boundary of firms’ user costs of capital. Moreover, this model shows that the level of venture capital investments is affected by the venture capitalists’ costs of management support and monitoring services and the price for raising new funds from uninformed capital providers. Using dynamic panel techniques and a data set of 16 European countries, I test the implications of the model. I find, inter alia, that the lending rate has a positive and significant impact on early-stage investments. (JEL G24, O16, 041)

Journal Article Details

Publisher Name:    Global Science Press

Language:    Multiple languages

DOI:    https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.37.3.297

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 37 (2004), Iss. 3 : pp. 297–328

Published online:    2004-03

AMS Subject Headings:    Duncker & Humblot

Copyright:    COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press

Pages:    32

Author Details

Schertler, Andrea

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