Prinzipal-Agent-Beziehung: First-best, second-best und third-best
Year: 2000
Author: Kraft, Holger, Reichling, Peter
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 33 (2000), Iss. 2 : pp. 151–181
Abstract
Relationship between Principal and Agent: First-best, Second-best and Third-best
This contribution discusses in discret language the classical relationship between principal and agent. It focuses on the pay-scale monotony. One of this contribution’s aims is to give a synopsis of the conditions that would ensure pay rises in second-best cases. The fact that the discussion focuses on risk-neutral principals only permits the general statement that second-best pay-scales either remain constant or point upward in at least one respect. This explains why second-best pay-scales dropping section-wise are characteristic of certain situations.
Where second-best pay-scales dropping section-wise are not permissible (thirdbest cases) the result is a loss in prosperity on account of the fact that any artificial pay-scale monotonisation reduces its stimulating effect. Moreover, the salaries principals pay their agents tend to be on the high side in the case of major backflows
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.33.2.151
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 33 (2000), Iss. 2 : pp. 151–181
Published online: 2000-02
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 31
Author Details
Kraft, Holger Email
Reichling, Peter Email
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