Year: 1996
Author: Schmid, Frank A.
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 29 (1996), Iss. 3 : pp. 402–427
Abstract
Banks, Shareholder Structure and Corporate Control (Part I)
This study investigates the impact of shareholder structure on firm performance. Two samples of large German stock corporations are analyzed. It can be shown that equity positions of banks have a positive impact on firm performance in 1974. In 1985, however, no impact of banks can be identified that goes beyond the positive influence of nonbank blockholders. The hypothesis is rejected that there has been no structural change between these two periods. An analysis of the banks’ supervisory board representation contradicts Edwards and Fischer (1994). These authors claim that the banks’ proxy voting does not translate into board seats held by banks. | This paper is to be published in two parts. This first part presents the hypotheses that are to be tested. Also, it defines the variables for the empirical analysis and it describes the dataset. The upcoming second part will present the empirical results.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.29.3.402
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 29 (1996), Iss. 3 : pp. 402–427
Published online: 1996-03
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 26
Author Details
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