Year: 1996
Author: Bester, Helmut, Scheepens, Joris P. J. F.
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 29 (1996), Iss. 4 : pp. 565–591
Abstract
This paper considers a two-period model in which a firm needs outside financing in period 2. If a firm establishes a reputation with a bank already in the first period, it may reduce the cost and increase the availability of bank debt in the second period. To establish such a reputation, the firm must induce the bank to monitor in period 1. Bank monitoring effort is non-contractible, so the firm induces the bank to monitor by taking an unsecured bank loan. In period 1 a bank loan may then be preferable to internal finance. This contrasts with a result by Myers and Majluf (1984) where firms always prefer to finance profitable investments internally.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.29.4.565
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 29 (1996), Iss. 4 : pp. 565–591
Published online: 1996-04
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 27
Author Details
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