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Die ECU-Wirtschaft

Year:    1992

Author:    Spahn, Heinz-Peter

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 25 (1992), Iss. 4 : pp. 469–490

Abstract

The ECU-Economy – Modelling the Implications of European Currency Union

The consequences of the transition of the EMS into a European Currency Union are analysed by use of a macroeconomic two-country model and a game-theoretic approach as to economic policy decisions. Supply-side distinctions of both countries, modelled by a different path of wage costs, lead to country-specific rates of interest and inflation in the EMS, but result in divergent paths of income and employment in the ECU-system. Although the European Central Bank is equipped with the same utility function as the German Bundesbank inflation and interest rates are higher as compared to the German case. Enduring disparities in the countries’ welfare promote European structural and redistributional policies with questionable results.

Journal Article Details

Publisher Name:    Global Science Press

Language:    Multiple languages

DOI:    https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.25.4.469

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 25 (1992), Iss. 4 : pp. 469–490

Published online:    1992-04

AMS Subject Headings:    Duncker & Humblot

Copyright:    COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press

Pages:    22

Author Details

Spahn, Heinz-Peter

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