THIS IS THE DEV/TESTING WEBSITE IPv4: 3.142.242.51 IPv6: || Country by IP: GB
Journals
Resources
About Us
Open Access

The Political Economy of Monetary Policy Decisions

Year:    1988

Author:    Goodhart, Charles A. E

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 21 (1988), Iss. 1 : pp. 1–7

Abstract

The Political Economy of Monetary Policy Decisions

Mayer (1987) claims that the Central Bank does not operate discretionary monetary policy efficiently owing to “political pressures, the central bank’s self-interest and the potential for X-inefficiency”. While this politico-economic approach can be illuminating, Mayer does not specify in sufficient detail the nature of such political pressures. One cause of such pressures may be a desire of the majority, of poorer workers, to redistribute wealth away from the rich rentier. While my personal experience leads me to dismiss the “self-interest” and “X-inefficiency” theories, Iwould put more weight than Mayer on time-inconsistency problems.

Journal Article Details

Publisher Name:    Global Science Press

Language:    Multiple languages

DOI:    https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.21.1.1

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 21 (1988), Iss. 1 : pp. 1–7

Published online:    1988-01

AMS Subject Headings:    Duncker & Humblot

Copyright:    COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press

Pages:    7

Author Details

Goodhart, Charles A. E

  1. Barro, Robert: “Recent Developments in the Theory of Rules versus Discretion,” Economic Journal, Supplement, 96, 1986, 23 – 27.  Google Scholar
  2. Barro, Robert and David Gordon: “Rules, discretion and regulation in a model of monetary policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, July 1983, 101 – 102.  Google Scholar
  3. Barro, Robert and David Gordon: “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,” Journal of Political Economy, 91, August 1983, 589 – 610.  Google Scholar
  4. Frey, Bruno and Friedrich Schneider: “Central Bank behavior: A positive empirical analysis,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 7, May 1981, 291 – 316.  Google Scholar
  5. Kydland, Finn and Edward Prescott: “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans,” Journal of Political Economy, 85, (June 1977), 473 – 91.  Google Scholar
  6. Mayer, Thomas: “The Debate About Monetarist Policy Recommendations,” Kredit und Kapital, 20, 1987, 281 – 302.  Google Scholar
  7. Parkin, Michael and Robin Bade: “Central Bank laws and monetary policy”, Paper presented at the Fifth Interlaken Conference on Analysis and Ideology, June 1978, unpublished.  Google Scholar
  8. Poole, William: “Monetary Control and the Political Business Cycle”, Cato Journal, 5, Winter 1986, 685 – 700.  Google Scholar