Year: 2006
Author: Sell, Friedrich L., Wiens, Marcus
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 126 (2006), Iss. 4 : pp. 605–633
Abstract
In this paper, we take trust as a specific, cooperative investment. The trustor is mainly interested in the possibility to rely on the trustee ("reliance"), while the trustee's object is to receive a trustworthy signal ("trust responsiveness"). The value of a trust relationship amounts and equals to not less than the social surplus which it can generate. On the one hand, a social optimal solution is feasible in the case where both parties agree on "liquidated damages" (perfect jurisdiction). Yet, it is also possible, on the other hand, to achieve a second best solution in a non-perfect jurisdiction world when "trust responsiveness" comes into play.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.126.4.605
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 126 (2006), Iss. 4 : pp. 605–633
Published online: 2006-04
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 29