Anreize zur Risikoselektion? Anmerkungen zum Risikostrukturausgleich in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung
Year: 2000
Author: Felder, Stefan
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 120 (2000), Iss. 2 : pp. 187–206
Abstract
Risk adjustment schemes (RAS) within social insurance are designed to prevent health insurers from engaging in risk selection. We show that the current German RAS still creates incentives for insurers to select risk. In particular the geographic range of RAS, the risk-adjusters and financing health insurance by means of wage contributions rather than premiums create incentives for risk selection. We discuss alternatives to RAS such as health insurance premiums complemented by means tested transfers which could reduce some of the incentive problems.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.120.2.187
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 120 (2000), Iss. 2 : pp. 187–206
Published online: 2000-02
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 20