Year: 1999
Author: Strohmenger, Rainer, Wambach, Achim
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 119 (1999), Iss. 1 : pp. 121–149
Abstract
We study the effects of genetic tests on markets for life, disability, retirement, and health insurance. Insurers cannot observe the amount of loss in the first three insurance areas, and, hence, in case of asymmetric information an insurance market equilibrium in separating contracts cannot be installed. The advantages and disadvantages of several different policy proposals are discussed. For the health insurance market, the German system of a compulsory public health insurance turns out to be very robust against informational asymmetry. However it is to be expected that under the present legal framework high risk people will shift from the private to the public insurance sector. If treatment costs exceed the patient's willingness to pay risk classification using genetic tests can even enhance efficiency.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.119.1.121
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 119 (1999), Iss. 1 : pp. 121–149
Published online: 1999-01
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 29