Year: 1999
Author: Blankart, Charles B.
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 119 (1999), Iss. 3 : pp. 331–350
Abstract
The paper investigates the political process of government centralization in Germany as compared to Switzerland. Centralization is explained to result from subcentral governments' endeavor to form tax cartels confirmed by federal legislation. In Germany the federal government can assume such legislative power, in Switzerland it has to rely on referenda. The data reflect the hypothesis that the growth of centralization depends on this institutional difference. Moreover, the average tax burden seems to increase with centralization and in this sense confirms the Leviathan hypothesis.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.119.3.331
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 119 (1999), Iss. 3 : pp. 331–350
Published online: 1999-03
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 20