Year: 1997
Author: Wrede, Matthias
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 117 (1997), Iss. 4 : pp. 585–601
Abstract
This paper deals with public expenditure in a federal nation, when different levels of government decide upon tax rates and public expenditure. Usually the Nash equilibrium, at which the lower level of government neglects the influence of public expenditure on tax revenue, is inefficient. As it turns out, a small increase in the supply of specific public goods - representing worse substitutes for (highly) taxed private goods in comparison to other public goods - raises social welfare.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.585
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 117 (1997), Iss. 4 : pp. 585–601
Published online: 1997-04
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 17