Year: 1995
Author: Meran, Georg
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 115 (1995), Iss. 1 : pp. 67–91
Abstract
Different typs of pollution liability funds are analysed. The joint liability fund with internal recourse to members should increase the coverage of claims by collectivizing the liability of injurers under limited liability. As a result the incentives for prevention are poor even if internal safety rules are established (the case of environmental cooperatives). The same applies to a system of collective liability in the presence of multicausal damages. To solve this problem we propose a simple incentive scheme for environmental liability funds which secures efficiency and a balanced budget ex ante. If injurer are riskavers the internal regulation of prevention increases welfare since the contribution system must not serve as an incentive scheme.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.115.1.67
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 115 (1995), Iss. 1 : pp. 67–91
Published online: 1995-01
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 25