Year: 1995
Author: Heinemann, Friedrich
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 115 (1995), Iss. 4 : pp. 605–622
Abstract
The Maastricht Treaty, with its definition of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), has changed the incentives for national debt. Even though it has been tried to keep member states responsible for their national debt, the analysis shows that discipline solely from market pressure cannot be expected. In particular, the increasing redistribution through the EU budget weakens market discipline. The mechanism of political discipline of the Treaty is provided with an effective sanction in the second stage of EMU, an equivalent sanction in the third stage of EMU is missing, however. Therefore, there is the danger that debt incentives become powerful especially after the introduction of a common European currency.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.115.4.605
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 115 (1995), Iss. 4 : pp. 605–622
Published online: 1995-04
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 18