Year: 1993
Author: Pichler, Eva
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 113 (1993), Iss. 1 : pp. 115–121
Abstract
According to Horn and Wolinsky's model on the patterns of unionization the workers' and the firm's interests with respect to the scope of unionization are always opposed to each other. Of course, transaction costs of bargaining can establish a region in which an encompassing union is more profitable for both parties. This note demonstrates that due to externalities of negotiations the range of this possibility is much larger than the difference of expected transaction costs.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.113.1.115
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 113 (1993), Iss. 1 : pp. 115–121
Published online: 1993-01
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 7