Year: 1991
Author: Trockel, Walter
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 111 (1991), Iss. 2 : pp. 207–226
Abstract
The present work treats the question what conditions on the information of players about the game and the other players suffice to make the Nash-equilibrium of a noncooperative game a meaningful solution concept. Moreover it is asked what information about the other players' types has to be transferred to the central authority to make him able to effectively design a mechanism (game form), which made a game by concrete populations characteristica, implement the socially desired result as a Nashequilibrium. Recent articles concerning this problem are discussed, an approach by the author is suggested.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.111.2.207
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 111 (1991), Iss. 2 : pp. 207–226
Published online: 1991-02
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 20