Year: 1991
Author: Kuckshinrichs, Wilhelm
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 111 (1991), Iss. 2 : pp. 227–250
Abstract
The discussion of the allocation of a groundwater resource from a property rights point of view is extended to the cost of controlling the implementation of contractual agreements. With a low fine for breaking the agreements contractual fidelity is not enforceable. Even with a high fine the acquiescence of a contract violation ordinarily is profitable for a water company. The social optimal allocation is not reached in this model. But a social optimal fine may be defined that minimizes the difference between the social and the property rights solution.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.111.2.227
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 111 (1991), Iss. 2 : pp. 227–250
Published online: 1991-02
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 24