Year: 1991
Author: Wagner, Thomas
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 111 (1991), Iss. 4 : pp. 505–526
Abstract
Since at free access equilibrium the marginal product of the private input is below opportunity costs, the common property renewable ressource is overexploited. Conjectures efficient limit the degree of rent dissipation. An efficient Nash equilibrium exists when output is sold in an imperfectly competitive market. Optimum group size depends on price elasticity, on elasticity of the input productivity and the imputed price of the resource. By transition to private property efficiency gains can be captured, but without compensating transfers the conversion is not Pareto superior. To this proposition a counterexample is presented.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: Multiple languages
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.111.4.505
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 111 (1991), Iss. 4 : pp. 505–526
Published online: 1991-04
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 22