Year: 2017
Author: Iwasa, Yoichi, Vollmer, Uwe
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 50 (2017), Iss. 4 : pp. 509–543
Abstract
In many countries, legislators have introduced special bank resolution regimes in order to handle the „too-big-to-fail"-(TBTF)-problem. Bank resolution schemes allow supervisors to restructure or liquidate an ailing bank, even without the consent of the bank owners. We identify key elements of bank resolution schemes and consider how they are implemented in Japan, the US, the Euro area, and in the UK. We compare the bank resolution regimes in these countries and evaluate whether they comply with the „Key Attributes" proposed by the Financial Stability Board. We also ask whether they are effective in addressing the TBTF-problem and promoting financial stability.
Journal Article Details
Publisher Name: Global Science Press
Language: English
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.50.4.509
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 50 (2017), Iss. 4 : pp. 509–543
Published online: 2017-12
AMS Subject Headings: Duncker & Humblot
Copyright: COPYRIGHT: © Global Science Press
Pages: 35
Keywords: G38 G01 G21 Bank resolution too-big-to-fail statutory bail-in bank levy resolution fund single-point-of-entry multiple-point-of-entry
Author Details
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yoichi Iwasa / Uwe Vollmer: Tolling the Bell for “Too-Big-to-Fail”? – A Comparison Between Four Special Bank Resolution Regimes | 1 |