The Impact of Asymmetric Information on Optimal Investments, Learning and Exit Outcomes
Year: 2019
Author: Julius Tennert
Series: Studienreihe der Stiftung Kreditwirtschaft an der Universität Hohenheim, Vol. 57
Copyright Year: 2019
Book Details
ISBN: 978-3-89644-753-1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-89644-753-1
Published online: 2019-11
Edition: 1
Language: English
Pages: 152
Keywords: Agency Cost Exit Outcome Funding Relationships Human Capital IPO Learning Moral Hazard Trade Sale Exit Agency Cost Exit Outcome Funding Relationships Human Capital IPO Learning Moral Hazard Trade Sale Exit Agency Cost Exit Outcome Funding Relationships Human Capital IPO Learning Moral Hazard Trade Sale Exit Agency Cost Exit Outcome Funding Relationships Human Capital IPO Learning Moral Hazard Trade Sale Exit Agency Cost Exit Outcome Funding Relationships Human Capital IPO Learning Moral Hazard Trade Sale Exit Agency Cost Exit Outcome Funding Relationships Human Capital IPO Learning Moral Hazard Trade Sale Exit Agency Cost Exit Outcome Funding Relationships Human Capital IPO Learning Moral Hazard Trade Sale Exit Agency Cost Exit Outcome Funding Relationships Human Capital IPO Learning Moral Hazard Trade Sale Exit Agency Cost Exit Outcome Funding Relationships Human Capital IPO Learning Moral Hazard Trade Sale Exit
Author Details
Subjects: Banking ,
Pricing
Institution: €59.90 (incl. local VAT if applicable)
Individual: €59.90 (incl. local VAT if applicable)
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Preface | 6 | ||
Contents | 8 | ||
List of Figures | 10 | ||
List of Tables | 12 | ||
List of Abbreviations | 14 | ||
1 Introduction | 16 | ||
2 Moral Hazard in VC Finance | 22 | ||
2.1 Introduction | 22 | ||
2.2 Formal Model | 25 | ||
2.2.1 The Entrepreneurial Project | 25 | ||
2.2.2 Maximization Function of the VC | 27 | ||
2.2.3 Participation Constraint of the Entrepreneur | 27 | ||
2.2.4 Solution without Relevance of Human Capital | 29 | ||
2.2.5 Solution with Relevance of Human Capital | 30 | ||
2.2.6 Opportunity Loss of the VC | 30 | ||
2.3 Empirical Approach | 35 | ||
2.3.1 Sample | 35 | ||
2.3.2 Econometric Method | 35 | ||
2.3.3 Measures | 37 | ||
2.3.4 Empirical Results | 40 | ||
2.3.5 Robustness Checks | 44 | ||
2.4 Conclusion | 50 | ||
3 Learning in Funding Relationships | 54 | ||
3.1 Introduction | 54 | ||
3.2 Learning and Comprehensiveness | 57 | ||
3.3 Frictions in the Learning Process | 59 | ||
3.4 Formal Hypotheses | 61 | ||
3.5 Data and Methodology | 64 | ||
3.5.1 Sample | 64 | ||
3.5.2 Measures | 65 | ||
3.5.3 Econometric Specification | 75 | ||
3.6 Results | 78 | ||
3.6.1 Summary Statistics and Selection Regressions | 78 | ||
3.7 Conclusion | 87 | ||
4 VCs as Intermediaries in Exits | 92 | ||
4.1 Introduction | 92 | ||
4.2 Agency Cost in IPO and Trade Sale Exits | 95 | ||
4.2.1 Adverse Selection Pre-Exit | 95 | ||
4.2.2 Moral Hazard Post-Exit | 96 | ||
4.3 Investor Characteristics | 98 | ||
4.4 Firm Characteristics | 101 | ||
4.5 Sample and Methodology | 102 | ||
4.5.1 Sample | 102 | ||
4.5.2 Methodology | 103 | ||
4.5.3 Control Variables | 104 | ||
4.6 Results | 106 | ||
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics | 106 | ||
4.6.2 Multivariate Analysis | 112 | ||
4.6.3 Classification Tree Analysis | 117 | ||
4.7 Conclusion | 129 | ||
5 Conclusion | 132 | ||
5.1 Summary of the Main Results | 132 | ||
5.2 Outlook | 133 | ||
Bibliography | 136 |